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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











KRISTAL BROWN, USCIS; MICHAEL HORVATH, USCIS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-18-cv-01383) 
Magistrate Judge:  Honorable Maureen P. Kelly 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 3, 2020 
 
Before: KRAUSE, MATEY, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 







 Mahnaz Haser appeals from the District Court’s judgment against her in this 
naturalization proceeding under 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c).  We will affirm. 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




  In 2001, Haser received asylum in the United States on the basis of alleged 
persecution in Iran.  She later adjusted her status to lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) 
on the basis of that relief.  During Haser’s asylum proceeding, she claimed that she is an 
Iranian citizen and that Iranian officials detained and tortured her from 1994 until she fled 
to the United States in 2000.  In fact, however, Haser was and is a citizen of Sweden and 
lived in Sweden from 1987 through 2000.  She also traveled between Sweden and the 
United States on a Swedish passport five times in 1999.  Haser did not disclose these 
facts, all of which she now concedes, in her applications or interviews. 
 Haser later filed a naturalization application with United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (“USCIS”).  During the naturalization process, Haser finally 
disclosed certain facts regarding her Swedish background (while continuing to 
misrepresent others), and USCIS learned other such facts through other means.  On the 
basis of that information, USCIS ultimately determined that Haser’s asylum and resultant 
LPR status were based on false information and that she never qualified for asylum from 
Iran because her Swedish citizenship showed that she had “firmly resettled” in that 
country.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi).  Thus, USCIS determined that Haser was 
ineligible for naturalization and denied her application. 
 Haser exhausted her administrative remedies and then filed with the District Court 





USCIS filed a motion to dismiss Haser’s complaint or for summary judgment.  The 
District Court, acting through a Magistrate Judge on the parties’ consent, properly treated 
the motion as one for summary judgment and granted it.  Haser appeals. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c), and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Koszelnik v. Sec’y DHS, 828 F.3d 175, 179 n.5 
(3d Cir. 2016).  Our review is de novo, see id., and we apply the principles summarized 
in Koszelnik, 828 F.3d at 179, and Saliba v. Attorney General, 828 F.3d 182, 189 (3d Cir. 
2016).  Having done so, we will affirm substantially for the reasons explained by the 
District Court.   
In brief, Haser is eligible for naturalization only if she “has been lawfully admitted 
to the United States for permanent residence.”  8 U.S.C. § 1429.  Although Haser 
received asylum and adjusted her status to LPR on that basis, she has not been “lawfully 
admitted to the United States for permanent residence” for this purpose because her grant 
of asylum and resultant adjustment of status were based on material misinformation as 
summarized above.  See Koszelnik, 828 F.3d at 179-80 & n.20; see also Saliba, 828 F.3d 
at 192; Gallimore v. Att’y Gen., 619 F.3d 216, 223–24 & n.6 (3d Cir. 2010).  Haser does 
not contest that her Swedish citizenship was material to her asylum application, which it 
unquestionably was.1  The omission of this information from Haser’s application means 
 
1 Information is material for this purpose “if it tends to shut off a line of inquiry which is 
relevant to the alien’s eligibility and which might well have resulted in a proper 
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that she has not been “lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence” 
regardless of whether that omission resulted from fraud or willful misrepresentation.  See 
Koszelnik, 828 F.3d at 180 & n.20; Saliba, 828 F.3d at 192; Gallimore, 619 F.3d at 223–
24 & n.6. 
 Haser raises essentially two arguments on appeal, but both lack merit.  First, she 
argues that USCIS should be equitably estopped from denying her naturalization 
application because the asylum officer who interviewed her in 2001 committed 
misconduct.  In particular, Haser asserts that the officer propositioned her for a romantic 
date and then “prevented her” from disclosing her Swedish background.   
Accepting these assertions as true, and leaving aside the fact that they do not 
explain all of the instances in which Haser failed to disclose her Swedish background,2 
 
determination that [s]he be excluded.”  Koszelnik, 828 F.3d at 180 (quotation marks 
omitted).  In this case, USCIS concluded that Haser’s Swedish citizenship rendered her 
ineligible for asylum from Iran because it showed that she had “firmly resettled” in 
Sweden.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15.  Haser does not contest 
that issue and, regardless of whether she actually had “firmly resettled” in Sweden, her 
Swedish citizenship was at the very least material to that issue under the definition quoted 
above.  Thus, we need not determine whether Haser actually had “firmly resettled” in 
Sweden.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15(a) and (b) (establishing exceptions that, at first blush, 
do not appear to apply to Haser). 
 
2 Haser failed to disclose her ties to Sweden and her previous travels to the United States 
in her asylum application, her asylum statement, and her application to adjust status.  She 
also repeated her false claim about being imprisoned in Iran from 1994 through 2000 
even as late as her second naturalization interview in 2011.  Haser attributes the omission 
of this information from her (handwritten) asylum statement to “unscrupulous work by a 
notario and an attorney.”  She does not argue that that alleged circumstance by itself 
renders her admission “lawful,” and it does not.  See Gallimore, 619 F.3d at 224 n.6 
(citing, inter alia, Walker v. Holder, 589 F.3d 12, 20–21 (1st Cir. 2009)). 
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these assertions do not state a basis for relief.  Courts generally cannot grant 
naturalization on the basis of equitable considerations or by estoppel.  See Koszelnik, 828 
F.3d at 182 & n.27 (citing, inter alia, INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 885 (1988)).  To 
the extent that such principles may be relevant in this context, Haser has not alleged the 
kind of detrimental reliance on a governmental representation that might state a basis for 
relief.  See Duran-Pichardo v. Att’y Gen., 695 F.3d 282, 285 n.7 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 Second, Haser argues that, when she applied for asylum on the basis of 
persecution in Iran, she actually qualified for asylum on the basis of persecution in 
Sweden because she was the victim of domestic violence in that country.  Haser further 
argues that USCIS and the District Court erred by failing to decide that issue.  That issue, 
however, is beyond the scope of this naturalization proceeding.   
In order to naturalize, Haser bears the burden of showing that she “has been 
lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence.”  8 U.S.C. § 1429 
(emphasis added).  And in order for Haser’s allegations regarding her mistreatment in 
Sweden to assist her in that purpose, she would have to show that she (1) applied for and 
properly received asylum on that basis, and then (2) applied for and properly received an 
adjustment to LPR status on that basis as well.   
Haser does not allege that she has taken any of these steps.  Nor has she cited any 
authority authorizing or requiring USCIS or the District Court to adjudicate those issues 
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in the context of this naturalization proceeding.3  We are aware of none.  Thus, we 
express no opinion on whether it might still be possible for Haser to seek asylum and a 
“readjustment” of status on the basis of her allegations regarding persecution in Sweden.  
Cf. Turfah v. USCIS, 845 F.3d 668, 676–77 (6th Cir. 2017) (Boggs, J., concurring) 
(noting that “[t]here is no explicit mechanism for an immigrant who already has LPR 
status to petition for an adjustment so as to be deemed ‘lawfully admitted’” for 
naturalization purposes).  We note, however, that Haser’s attempt to raise this asylum 
claim many years after arriving in the United States might be untimely.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(a)(2)(B), (D). 
III. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
 
3 The only authority on which Haser relies for this proposition is our statement that “an 
alien who has obtained lawful permanent resident status by fraud, or who was otherwise 
not entitled to it, has not been lawfully admitted.”  Koszelnik, 828 F.3d at 180 (emphasis 
added).  Haser argues that she was “otherwise entitled” to her LRP status because she 
suffered persecution in Sweden.  Our statement in Koszelnik, however, refers to reasons 
for concluding that a noncitizen’s existing LPR status does not constitute a lawful 
admission.  That statement does not support a free-ranging inquiry into whether a 
noncitizen might have been eligible for lawful LPR status on the basis of some other 
unapplied-for ground. 
